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Abstract
In the past few years, there has been a growth in Internet markets run by
online investment bankers, where companies and investors can buy and sell initial
public offerings (IPOs) of corporate stock.  In this study, we confine our examination
to the first of what we anticipate will be several phases in the evolution of Internet
IPOs:  the online distribution of shares. This implies the beginning of a general
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disintermediation in the IPO process where traditional roles of investment banks are
being circumvented via the Internet as participants search for greater market
efficiency.  This is an important research area because potentially it affects all public
companies, or companies considering going public, the investment banking
industry, and all stock investors.
We address two research issues not considered by previous studies.  What
factors affect organizational choice of online vs. traditional IPO distribution?  What
are the financial performance differences for IPOs distributed using online and
traditional processes?  These issues were addressed using company characteristic
and financial performance data from 27 IPOs from the last half of 1998.  We find
that the Internet IPO firms are larger, have younger CEOs, choose more reputable
investment banks and are more likely to be involved in a Web-based business,
directly employing the Internet in their product or service, than the firms that choose
the traditional method of going public. In addition, market performance, both initially
and over the first three months of trading, is significantly greater for Internet IPOs.
Keywords:  Electronic commerce, electronic market, initial public offering
(IPO), investment banking, financial performance
I.  INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, there has been a growth in Internet markets run by
online investment bankers, or “e-managers” (Dorsey 1998), where companies and
investors can buy and sell initial public offerings (IPOs) of corporate stock. Tully
(1999b) suggests that investment banking is particularly suited for the Internet.  In
fact, by early 1999, the mechanics of Internet IPOs have quickly progressed from
the first phase, a partial distribution of IPO shares directly to investors via the
Internet, to the actual determination of the offer price and the allocation of shares
through an online auction process. Ultimately, this suggests disintermediation in IPO
marketing as the need for brokers to sell and deliver the IPO and investment banks
to solicit offers from their clients is eliminated.
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In phase I, Internet markets have provided companies with a choice of
whether to use a traditional investment banker or a banker providing the new online
services to distribute some portion of their IPO.  When companies are considering
an IPO, they must first evaluate the financial issues to decide whether it is a viable
financing option, and then they must identify which channel(s) they wish to use to
distribute the IPO. In this paper, we focus on the second decision. While a study of
the full spectrum of Internet IPO mechanics is interesting and vital, we have chosen
to confine our research to the first phase of the Internet IPO evolution, partial online
distribution, in an effort to establish a foundation of information from which to
examine future phases. Hence, in the remainder of the paper, when we refer to
Internet IPOs, we are strictly referring to firms whose shares are partially distributed
online. This study has an interdisciplinary focus, combining both information
systems and finance research issues.
Past information systems research has focused on economic analysis of the
general impact of electronic markets (Bakos 1991; Benjamin and Wigand 1995;
Malone et al. 1987, 1989; Rayport and Sviokla 1994).  Because online financial
product and service markets are a relatively new phenomenon, a limited amount of
research has been conducted related to the impact of these new information
technology enabled channels on financial industries, such as banking, real estate,
and insurance (Barrett and Walsham 1999; Crowston and Wigand 1999;
Ramaswami et al. 1998; Salam and Zurada 1999).  In this study, we address two
research issues not considered by previous studies for the new phenomenon of
online distribution of initial public offerings.  What factors affect organizational
choice of online vs. traditional IPO distribution?  What are the financial performance
differences for IPOs distributed using online and traditional processes?  In the broad
scope of electronic commerce research, our study falls within the electronic
commerce application area of the Applegate et al. (1996) electronic commerce
research framework and the consumer interface area of the Shaw et al. (1997)
research framework.
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In the following sections, we describe the traditional and online IPO
processes, discuss the methodology used to address our research issues, and
present our findings and conclusions including the implications for IPO participants.
This is an important research area because potentially it affects all public
companies, or companies considering going public, the investment banking
industry, and all stock investors.  It is also important because of the large amounts
of money typically involved in IPOs.  This is indicated by the growth in online stock
trading, of which IPOs are one component.  Online trades accounted for 17% of
total retail trades in 1997 (Dreyfuss 1998) and increased to 22% by the first half of
1998 (Robinson 1999).
II.  TRADITIONAL IPO PROCESS
The traditional IPO process involves the issuing firm, an investment bank that
acts as an intermediary between the seller and buyers, and a select group of,
typically, larger investors. The investment bank provides services such as pricing
the stock, forming syndicates of investment banks and their brokerage arms to
distribute shares, providing access to a select group of large investors to facilitate
distribution, and, if need be, price support in the IPO after-market by placing its own
buy orders for the stock.  Prior to the offer, the investment bank contacts its buying
clientele and explains the details of the offer and the selling company. During this
time, the investment bank assesses interest in the IPO and takes preliminary
subscriptions for shares. The bank then uses this information to determine the price
and the number of shares to sell. Because many IPOs are over-subscribed, the
bank pro-rates the shares during the final distribution based on the original
subscriptions. This service comes at a price, however, as the investment bank
receives a commission, typically based on the amount of money raised in the IPO.
This process has been used for IPOs for well over a century, but some
questionable activities have evolved during that time. There is the practice of
spinning, where the investment bank allocates shares to favored or potential
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customers in hopes of winning future business. One could argue that by spinning,
investment banks preclude the average investor from some potentially attractive
IPOs. Several securities firms are currently under investigation by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) for such practices (Bransten and Wingfield 1999).
There is also underpricing. The stock price run-up of the average IPO on the first
day of trading is so great that it appears that investment banks are often setting the
offer price too low.  Theories have emerged to explain the existence and magnitude
of underpricing and defend it as an efficient way to clear the IPO market (Carter and
Manaster 1990). However, there is still a real possibility that many companies are
being sold too cheaply.
Consider the case of Theglobe.com, a Website builder that debuted in
February 1999.  Theglobe’s bankers, Bear Stearns and Volpe Brown Whelan,
underwrote its shares for $9, raising $27.9 million in capital.  On the first day of
trading, the price rose to $63.50.  Had Theglobe sold the IPO for $63.50, rather than
$9, the company would have collected not $27.9 million but $197 million—seven
times the money to build the brand and develop new products (Tully 1999a).  Given
these transaction costs and a less than open IPO market, a new information
technology enabled IPO may offer a solution.
III.  NEW IPO PROCESS ENABLED BY INTERNET MARKETS
The primary difference between the traditional and online IPO process is the
role of the intermediary.  Bakos (1998) identified eight functions of a market that are
facilitated through intermediaries.  They include determination of product offerings,
search, price discovery, logistics, settlement, trust, legal, and regulatory.  The
differences in the anticipated phases in the diffusion of online IPO processes can
be described using these intermediary roles.  The phases occur as the participants
in the process search for greater market efficiency.
The roles of intermediaries in phase I, partial share distribution via the
Internet, include providing market access and IPO information (search), and IPO
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share offer price information (price discovery), as well as informing the investor that
the intermediary feels that the selling company is reputable (trust).  For phase II,
price determination via the Internet, the search and trust roles are similar, but the
share price is determined not by an offer price but through an auction or negotiation
mechanism.  The final phase phase, III, is disintermediation, where the IPO process
intermediary is no longer necessary.  This phase will only take place when the trust
between the share buyer and seller can be facilitated without an intermediary.
While changes in online investment banking are rapidly occurring, our focus
is confined to the initial phase of these changes:  online distribution of the IPO. This
relatively new IPO process involves the same seller but a different form of
intermediary.  The online investment bank provides an Internet-based IPO offering
a more open IPO market with access to a larger number of smaller investors.  Bob
Lessin, CEO of Wit Capital, identified this as a primary goal: to level the Wall Street
playing field by giving the little guy, individual investors, a chance to invest in a
company when it first offers shares to the public and before the stock actually
begins trading in the markets (Dorsey 1998).  Wit Capital allows the investor to
subscribe to shares at the offer price via the Internet, using Wit Capital’s homepage
to peruse pertinent documents concerning the issuing firm. While only a small
portion of shares is now allocated to those online investment banks in the
distributing syndicate, it appears to be expanding (Smith 1999).
The next phase of the online IPO process has been developed by William
Hambrecht, owner of W. R. Hambrecht & Co.  Using Mr. Hambrecht’s plan, dubbed
OpenIPO, investors submit bids for the number of shares they would take and at
what price. After a few weeks of taking bids, the offering price is set at the lowest
price at which all shares can be sold.  Those bidding above the offering price will get
all the shares they asked for at the offering price; those bidding at the offering price
will get a portion of their bid; and those bidding less than the offer price will not get
any shares.  No more than 10% of the shares sold can go to a single bidder, and
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Hambrecht reserves the right to limit the purchase of anyone seeking to buy more
than 1% (Bransten and Wingfield 1999).
IV.  METHODOLOGY
DATA
All firms going public were identified via information from IPO.Com, Inc.
IPO.Com, Inc provides offer dates, SIC codes, a business description, IPO
registration form and file dates, and the offer price. Firms that used the Internet to
distribute their IPO were identified using various issues of the Wall Street Journal.
We found nine firms issuing their initial public stock offering in this manner between
July 16, 1998 (Broadcast.Com, Inc.), and December 14, 1998 (Infospace.Com,
Inc.). In comparison, there were 84 IPOs in total between July 16, 1998, and
December 14, 1998, according to IPO.Com, Inc. We confined the IPOs to only
those issued in 1998 to ensure that we would have at least three months of stock
price data from which to work.
Comparable IPOs that were offered without the benefit of the Internet were
chosen in two ways. First, we selected an event time-matched firm for each Internet
IPO. The offering for these firms was within one day of the Internet IPO’s offering
and most (seven) were on the same day. We then selected a second group of IPOs
matched first by two digit SIC code and then by their offer date, getting as close to
the Internet IPO’s offering date as possible. Nine firms were selected using each
method, for a total of 27 firms. 
To examine the differences between the firms that choose the Internet to
market their IPOs and those that use the traditional method, we collected a number
of firm and market characteristic variables. Most of the data for each firm were
collected from the original IPO prospectus (forms S-1 or S-2), including the
managing underwriter, the firms’ most recently reported net income, revenues, the
age of the firm at the time of the offer, and the CEO’s age and salary. Information
regarding the high and low price range of the offer was found in the first or second
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amendment to the original S-1 or S-2. Additional offer-related information was taken
from the post-offer filing of form 424B. These data include the final offer price, the
number of shares offered, the number of outstanding shares after the offer, the total
expenses paid by the issuing firm, the underwriter’s commission or discount, the
book value of the firm, and the number of shares offered by private shareholders.
All of these documents are available on the EDGAR database from the Securities
and Exchange Commission. 
Security price and daily volume information from the offering day through 60
post-offer trading days were collected from Yahoo, Inc., with random verification
using various issues of the Wall Street Journal. Each IPO’s offering day return was
calculated as (P1-P0)/P0, where P0 is the original offer price as stated in the final
prospectus. Each subsequent day’s return was then calculated in a similar manner
and cumulative returns were simply the sum of the daily returns through any
particular day. We used the cumulative returns for the first five trading days as the
initial return and the cumulative return for the next 55 trading days as the after-
market return. The daily trading range was calculated as (Ph-Pl)/Pl where Pl is the
low price for the day and Ph the high price. The standard deviation of daily returns,
the average daily volume and the average daily price range were all estimated using
data from day 6 through day 60. Because underwriters often purchase shares in the
first few days of trading to support the offer price, the observations during this time
period may be misleading. Hence, we use days 6 through 60 to estimate daily
variables in an effort to eliminate any bias.
Finally, we used the zero to nine point scale developed by Carter and
Manaster (1990) and updated by Carter, Dark and Singh (1997) to quantify
underwriter reputation. The most prestigious underwriters are given a nine and the
least prestigious are given a zero. According to Carter and Manaster, underwriters
of high reputation are noted for choosing lower risk, larger firms than their less
prestigious counterparts and for being better at distributing the IPO. For four firms,
the underwriters were not listed in either paper and we used a zero for their
reputation, assuming that lack of information about these underwriters was
indicative of a lack of prestige.
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METHODS AND RESULTS
Descriptive statistics for daily returns, daily trading volumes, and daily trading
ranges for all 27 IPOs and for each sub-set of nine IPOs are found in Table 1. In
Panel A, means and standard deviations for all 60 trading days are presented. The
Internet IPOs posted the largest mean total cumulative return (3.09%) followed by
the time-matched IPOs (-0.03%), while the smallest return was posted for the SIC-
matched firms (-0.16%). The differences between these returns are not significant,
however. The Internet IPOs also had the highest daily share volumes and trading
ranges and these amounts were both significantly higher than either of the other
firm groups.
Similar statistics for the first five trading days (the initial return) and for days
6 through 60 (the after-market return) are found in Panels B and C, respectively. As
in Panel A, the Internet offerings had significantly higher totals in each category with
the exception of the initial return.  Charts of cumulative daily returns for all three
sub-sets of firms  from the offer through day 60 and for day 6 through 60 are found
in Figures 1 and 2, respectively. It is apparent from these charts that the Internet
IPOs out-perform the regular IPOs both from the offer day and in the post-offer
after-market.
Table 2 presents Spearman correlation coefficients, testing the
independence of daily after-market cumulative returns, volumes, and trading ranges
for a portfolio of all IPOs and for portfolios of each sub-set.  The coefficient
estimates for the full sample are found in Panel A and coefficient estimates for the
Internet IPOs, the SIC-matched IPOs and the time-matched IPOs are found in
Panels B through D, respectively.  Spearman rank correlation was used to prevent
any bias that may occur in a small sample from one or two outliers and because we
are making no assumptions about the distributions of the underlying populations of
these variables (for justification for the use of the Spearman rank correlation
technique, see Conover 1980).
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Table 1. Cumulative Daily Returns, Daily Volumes and Daily Trading
Ranges:  Internet IPOs vs. SIC-Matched and Time-Matched Traditional IPOs
All
IPOs
Internet
IPOs
SIC-Matched
IPOs
Time-Matched
IPOs
Mean Std Mean Std t test Mean Std t test Mean Std
Panel A:  Total Cumulative Return (Days: Offer through +60)
Daily Returns (%) 0.95 10.94 3.09 18.53 1.42 -0.16 2.97 0.28 -0.03 1.96
Daily Volumes
(shares)
408.11 665.45 949.58 863.35 6.66*** 158.84 318.22 0.86 115.91 220.70
Daily Trading
Range (%)
9.05 4.38 13.22 4.25 7.43*** 8.62 2.22 8.99*** 5.31 1.77
Panel B:  Initial Return (Days: Offer through +5)
Daily Returns (%) 9.77 36.68 26.83 62.95 0.99 1.77 7.86 0.24 0.88 2.63
Daily Volumes
(shares)
1439.2 1685.0 2895.1 2164.0 1.93* 882.62 870.16 0.69 540.03 670.97
Daily Trading
Range (%)
13.02 8.11 22.28 9.52 3.78*** 9.52 2.01 1.39 7.24 3.05
Panel C:  After-Market Return (Days: Offer +5 through Offer +60)
Daily Returns (%) 0.14 2.53 0.92 3.22 2.30** -0.34 2.16 0.56 -0.12 1.89
Daily Volumes
(shares)
318.67 489.53 788.87 630.88 17.1*** 93.05 40.47 2.01** 77.35 41.26
Daily Trading
Range (%)
8.73 4.99 12.45 4.83 8.08*** 8.53 2.25 9.26*** 5.14 1.54
Note: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by one, two and three asterisks,
respectively.
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Figure 1. Cumulative IPO Returns from Day 0 Through Day 60
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Figure 2. Cumulative IPO Returns from Day 6 Through Day 60
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Table 2. Spearman Correlations1
Daily Volumes3 Daily Trading Range3
Panel A:  All IPOs
Daily After-Market Cumulative Returns (%)2 0.124 0.066
Daily Volumes (shares) 1.000 0.694***
Panel B:  Internet IPOs
Daily After-Market Cumulative Returns (%) 0.419*** 0.240*
Daily Volumes (shares) 1.000 0.439***
Panel C:  SIC-matched IPOs
Daily After-Market Cumulative Returns (%) 0.061 -0.129
Daily Volumes (shares) 1.000 0.067
Panel D:  Time-matched IPOs
Daily After-Market Cumulative Returns (%) -0.145 -0.077
Daily Volumes (shares) 1.000 0.309**
1Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by one, two, and three asterisks, respectively.
2Daily after-market cumulative returns is the daily, relative price change for the appropriate portfolio of
stocks aggregated in event time from offer day + 5 through offer day + 60.
3Volumes and trading range (each day’s (high – low price)/low price) are the daily observations for the
appropriate portfolio of stocks aggregated in event time from offer day + 5 through offer day +60.
Interestingly, with the exception of the correlation between the daily returns
and the trading ranges for the time-matched IPOs, only the Internet IPO variables
are significantly correlated. All three of the variables are positively correlated with
one another. 
Descriptive statistics for all of the variables collected are found in Table 3.
The statistics are presented for all 27 IPOs and for the nine Internet IPOs and the
18 traditionally distributed IPOs. For each variable, both a t test of the difference in
means and an F test using the Wilcoxon rank-sums test of the difference in samples
are presented for the Internet and regular IPOs. As was the case with the Spearman
correlations, the non-parametric Wilcoxon test was included to prevent outlier bias
for a small sample and to avoid any distribution assumptions. The Wilcoxon test
was chosen over other similar nonparametric tests because of its power-efficiency
(for justification for the use of the Wilcoxon rank-sums technique, see Conover
1980).
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for 27 IPOs Issued Between
July 16, 1998, and December 14, 1998
All
IPOs
Internet
IPOs
Traditional
IPOs
Difference in
Samples
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std t test1 F stat2
Market Value ($000s)3 292,877 265,334 491,821 292,949 193,405 189,362 3.21*** 2.91***
Revenues ($000s) 400,844 783,120 138,479 388,130 532,026 901,330 1.58 2.03**
Net Income ($000s) -4,083 9,512 -2,669 4,254 -4,789 11,326 0.70 0.08
Age of Firm (years) 6.67 9.74 3.33 1.66 8.33 11.62 1.79* 1.10
Book to Market (%) 55.41 142.26 13.96 10.25 76.14 171.86 1.53 3.11***
CEO Age (years) 44.30 8.80 38.11 7.52 47.39 7.83 2.94*** 2.65***
CEO salary ($000s) 264.07 184.45 234.44 166.89 278.89 195.52 0.58 0.77
Offer Size ($000s) 52,478 43,177 48,861 22,311 54,286 51,054 0.38 0.78
Underwriter Reputation4 6.92 3.37 8.81 0.33 5.98 3.81 3.13*** 2.22**
Underwriter Discount5 7.26 0.92 7.00 0.01 7.39 0.01 1.46 0.82
File to Offer (days) 97.19 52.83 92.80 34.44 99.38 60.79 0.36 0.21
Insider (%)6 5.62 9.09 2.37 5.13 7.25 10.29 1.33 1.05
Expenses ($000s)7 2,689.56 6,304.13 1,261.11 423.18 3,404.78 7,686.17 1.18 0.95
Initial Return (%)8 48.87 116.80 134.17 176.44 6.22 20.90 2.17* 2.55**
Cumulative Return (%)9 7.86 0.60 50.77 75.64 -13.60 37.09 2.41** 2.24**
Std Dev of Return (%)10 6.83 3.87 9.89 3.93 5.29 2.87 3.47*** 2.78***
Relative Offer Spread11 0.30 2.67 1.78 3.38 -0.44 1.94 2.18** 2.23**
Daily Volume (shares) 318.67 489.53 788.87 630.88 83.57 60.37 3.35*** 3.42***
Daily Trade Range
(%)12
8.73 4.99 12.45 4.83 6.88 4.02 3.17*** 2.81***
1Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by one, two, and three asterisks, respectively.
2Result of the Wilcoxon Rank Sums test.
3As of the fifth day following the IPO.
4Reputation is measured via Carter/Manaster Tombstone Ranking (see Carter et al. 1995).  It is discrete where
nine is most prestigious and zero least.
5The discount (commission) is measured relative to the offer price.
6Insider is the percentage of the offer represented by the firm’s private shareholders.
7Expenses is the total expenses of the offer incurred by the issuing firm.
8Initial return is the cumulative relative price change for the first five days of the offering.
9Cumulative return is the cumulative relative price change from day six following the offer to day 60.
10The standard deviation of the return is measured from day 6 to day 60.
11Relative offer spread is the offer price less the average of the maximum and the minimum possible offer price
as listed in the preliminary prospectus.
12Trading range is the difference between the day’s high and low price relative to the low price.
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It appears that the firms that selected the Internet for IPO distribution are
significantly larger in terms of market value than firms choosing traditional
distribution venues. The Internet firms also used more reputable underwriters and
their CEO was significantly younger. Other than these three variables, however, no
other unequivocal differences appear for any of the other fundamental firm
characteristics. 
For each of the market variables—returns, standard deviation of returns,
trading volumes, and trading ranges—the Internet IPOs are significantly greater.
Perhaps the most interesting difference is the relative spread variable. This is
calculated as the actual offer price less the expected offer price. The expected offer
price is estimated as the median of the price range as proposed in the amendments
to the original prospectus. This is the price range the underwriter quotes its clients
during pre-offer book building. The negative relative spread figure for the regular
IPOs indicates that the offer price was set lower than the underwriters expected.
The positive figure for the Internet IPOs, however, suggests that the underwriters
set the offering price above what they had originally expected to offer. According to
the “partial adjustment phenomenon” as proffered by Hanley (1993), this positive
spread is an indication that the offer is probably underpriced in terms of market
value and should experience significant run-up in the early after-market. 
The Spearman correlation coefficients for the firm and market characteristic
variables are presented in Table 4.  Both initial returns and after-market returns are
related to many of the same characteristics.  Both are positively related to Internet
distribution, underwriter reputation, after-market volatility (standard deviation), daily
volume, and daily trading range.  Additionally, both are negatively related to CEO
age and the book to market ratio.  In addition to the variables described above, we
included a dummy variable (Web-based) where a one indicates that the firm
engages in a business that directly employs the Internet in its product or service.
Interestingly, the initial return appears related to this variable and to the relative
spread.  Because Web-based products and services are new, they are risky in
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nature. Hence, the investment bank is likely to discount the offer price considerably
to ensure an efficient market clearing. It may also suggest that the purchasers of
IPOs, the underwriter’s clients, find the Web-based firms attractive enough to bid-up
the price both during pre-offer solicitations and during the first few hours and days
of secondary market trading.
Use of the Internet to market the IPO is positively related to the relative
spread, underwriter reputation, after-market volatility, daily volume, and daily trading
range. Hence, better underwriters are first to take advantage of this new marketing
medium and, assuming that all 27 firms are qualitatively similar, the results imply
that use of the Internet to market IPOs increases volatility and volume. On the
negative side, Internet IPOs have fewer sales, lower book to market, and younger
CEOs.  It suggests that these IPOs are of a more speculative nature—yet
speculative firms do not generally go to the most prestigious investment banks (see
Carter and Manaster 1990).
In an effort to identify key relationships between market performance and the
various market and firm characteristics, and to reveal their marginal contribution to
the relationship, we used an ordinary least squares regression technique. These
regressions are found in Table 5. Initial returns (Panel A) and after-market returns
(Panel B) were regressed on Internet (a dummy variable where a one represents
firms using the Internet to market their IPOs), underwriter reputation, book to market
ratios, CEO age, the standard deviation of return, average daily volumes, average
daily trading ranges, and Web-based.  The raw independent variables are found in
the first regressions in each panel.  Other firm and market characteristic indepen-
dent variables were included in subsequent regressions but they altered neither the
adjusted R2 nor the identified relationships reported.
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Table 4. Spearman Correlation Coefficients1
Cumulative
Return
Days 6-60
Internet
(1=yes) Sales
Net
Income
Offer
Size
Age of
Firm Insider 2
Underwriter
Reputation 3
Initial Return
Days 1-5
0.293 0.504*** -0.277 -0.233 -0.183 -0.153 -0.215 0.349*
Cumulative
Return 6-60
1.000 0.444** -0.302 0.049 0.153 -0.336* -0.114 0.354*
Internet
(1=yes)
1.000 -0.403** 0.020 0.061 -0.221 -0.210 0.440**
Sales 1.000 0.044 0.585*** 0.113 0.233 0.094
Net Income 1.000 -0.035 0.051 -0.057 -0.075
Offer Size 1.000 -0.071 0.300 0.480**
Age of Firm 1.000 0.218 -0.363*
Insider 1.000 0.300
Underwriter
Reputation
1.000
Book to
Market CEO Age
Std
Return Volume
Trading
Range4
Web-
based5 Spread6
Initial Return
Days 1-5
-0.669*** -0.451*** 0.438** 0.510*** 0.524*** 0.503*** 0.475**
Cumulative
Return 6-60
-0.361* -0.435** 0.356* 0.518*** 0.412** 0.332 0.201
Internet (1=yes) -0.615*** -0.526*** 0.550*** 0.676*** 0.555*** 0.567*** 0.443**
Sales 0.291 0.225 -0.383** -0.201 -0.378* -0.343* -0.308
Net Income 0.233 0.373* -0.342* -0.349* -0.343* -0.194 -0.225
Offer Size 0.162 -0.149 0.037 0.307 0.084 0.086 -0.022
Age of Firm 0.191 0.477** -0.328* -0.248 -0.384 -0.256 -0.209
Insider 0.218 -0.148 -0.096 0.059 0.167 -0.301 -0.013
Underwriter Reputation -0.496** -0.560*** 0.406** 0.610*** 0.445** 0.534*** 0.478**
Book to Market 1.000 0.672*** -0.598*** -0.617*** 0.590*** -0.377* -0.465**
CEO Age 1.000 -0.498** -0.630*** -0.489*** -0.303 -0.399**
Std Return 1.000 0.829*** 0.974*** 0.475*** 0.318
Volume 1.000 0.829*** 0.526*** 0.489***
Trading Range 1.000 0.561*** 0.328*
Web-based 1.000 0.411**
1Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by one, two, and three asterisks, respectively.
2Insider is the percentage of the offer represented by the firm’s private shareholders.
3Underwriter reputation is a discrete variable where nine is most prestigious and zero is the least.
4Trading range is the difference between the day’s high and low price relative to the low price.
5Web-based is a binary variable where a one represents firms whose product or service directly employs
the use of the Internet.
6Spread indicates the difference between the offer price and the expected offer price as indicated in the
preliminary prospectus.
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Table 5. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis
Intercept
Internet
(1=yes)
Under-
writer
Rep.
Book to
Market
CEO
Age
Std
Return1
Daily
Volume1
Trading
Range
Web-
based
(1=yes)
Panel A:  Cumulative Return from Offer through First Five Days Regressed on Use of Internet to
Facilitate IPO Sales and Additional Variables
Coefficient 3.813 1.347 -0.080 0.201 -0.083 -7.476 -0.001 14.396 -1.192
t stat 2.92*** -1.83* 1.96* -2.21** -0.63 -0.01 1.66 -2.22**
Adj R2 0.457 F stat 2 3.73***
Coefficient3,4 -0.605 1.549 -0.016 0.038 -0.079 -5.715 -0.003 15.029 -1.219
t stat 3.23*** -0.36 0.96 -1.96* 0.48 -0.48 1.74* -2.26**
Adj R2 0.457 F stat 3.73
Panel B:  Cumulative Return from Offer Day +5 through Day 60 Regressed on Use of Internet to
Facilitate IPO Sales and Additional Variables
Coefficient -0.319 -0.332 0.013 0.030 -0.001 -7.342 0.001 3.032 0.353
t stat -1.35 0.59 1.18 -0.08 -0.80 8.13*** 0.44 1.35
Adj R2 0.589 F stat 5.66***
Coefficient3,4 -0.321 0.016 0.016 0.022 -0.005 -7.638 0.001 3.294 0.380
t stat -1.42 0.71 1.22 -0.35** -0.80 7.57*** 0.49 1.46
1These variables are estimated over days offer +five through +60.
2Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by one, two, and three asterisks, respectively.
3Underwriter reputation is the residual from a regression where reputation is regressed on Internet, CEO
age, Std Return, Volume, Trading Range, and Web-based.
4CEO age is the residual from a regression where CEO Age is regressed on Internet, Reputation, Std
Return, Volume, Trading Range, and the Web-based dummy variable.
It is apparent from the results that the important factor in initial return is the
use of the Internet (the coefficient is positive and significant at better than 1%).
Moreover, this is not simply a function of its line of business given that the Web-
based dummy variable is included in the regression and it too is significant and
negative. This could be explained by the underwriter’s discounting the offer price in
an effort to clear the market (see Carter and Manaster 1990). The underwriter may
have believed the market would be unreliable given the newness of an Internet
offering. The other variable that is significant is CEO age, which implies that the
offer price was set lower for Internet offerings with younger CEOs. Again, this could
be explained by the underwriter’s discounting of the offer price due to a suspect firm
characteristic.
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Because of strong inter-relationships among the independent variables, as
demonstrated in Table 4, we used a two-stage model for the second regression in
Panel A.  Underwriter reputation became the error term after being regressed on the
Internet dummy, CEO age, the standard deviation of return, the average daily
volume, the average trading range, and a Web-based line of business dummy
variable. CEO age became the error term after being regressed on the Internet
dummy, underwriter reputation, the standard deviation of return, the average daily
volume, the average trading range, and the Web-based dummy.  The results of the
second stage are found in the second regression in Panel A.  This technique failed
to alter the important results of the earlier regression.
In Panel B, similar regressions were estimated for the after-market return.
The only variable that was consistent in both regressions was the average daily
trading volume. The coefficient suggests that increases in volume are accompanied
by increased prices. This is consistent with earlier work (Karpoff 1987). However,
it may also be evidence that use of the Internet increases trading and thereby
trading efficiency.  In the two-stage model, regression 2, the one coefficient that
changes from the first regression is CEO age. While consistent in sign—negative—
the coefficient becomes significant in the second regression and suggests that the
market reacts favorably to offerings with the younger CEOs.  This implies that
investors bid up the after-market price of firms with younger CEOs because of the
potential for long-term profits.  Lewellen et al. (1987) explain that younger CEOs are
less likely to make myopic investment decisions for their firms.
In an effort to explain the use of the Internet to market IPOs, we used a
logistic regression. In such a model, the dependent variable is binary. We regress
the Internet dummy on underwriter reputation, book to market, CEO age, standard
deviation of return, the log of sales, the relative spread, and the Web-based
business dummy. There are three regressions presented in Table 6. In the first, all
seven independent variables are included in the model. None of the coefficients are
significant and the model itself is only significant at the 10% level. In the second
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regression, we only employed CEO age, standard deviation of return, and the Web-
based business dummy. While the model is significant at the 1% level, none of the
coefficients are significant. In an effort to remove multicollinearity among the
variables, we employed a two-stage model as described above. Standard deviation
of return became the error term when regressed on CEO age and the Web-based
business dummy. The second stage of this model is regression number 3. We
found that both the CEO age and the Web-based business dummy variable were
significant, suggesting that younger CEOs were more likely to choose this method
of marketing the IPO and that firms familiar with the Internet were more likely to
use it.
Table 6. Logistic Regression Analysis Using the Internet to Market IPOs
Dependent Variable: 1 = Internet IPO; 0 = Otherwise1
Regression Intercept
Under-
writer
Rep.
Book to
Market
CEO
Age
Std
Return
Log
Sales Spread
Web-
based
(1=yes) X2
1 -1.893 0.645 -6.156 -0.095 9.804 -0.007 -0.020 1.845 13.98*
0.22 0.66 0.61 0.135 0.00 0.00 0.92
2 3.192 -0.144 21.409 2.36 13.44***
2.27 0.91 2.60
3 6.347 -0.186 21.409 3.09 13.45***
3.99** 0.99 5.08**
1Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by one, two, and three asterisks, respectively.
2Underwriter reputation is a discrete variable where nine is most prestigious and zero is the least.
3In Regression 3, Std Return is the residual of a regression where Std Return is regressed on CEO Age
and Web-based.
V.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Raising equity in public markets involves many choices for the issuing firms.
Among these choices is how much stock to offer and at what price. They must also
decide whether to use an investment bank to underwrite the issue and, if so, which
investment bank. Traditionally, the underwriter pre-sells the entire offer to its clients,
thus determining an optimal offer price and the demand for the issue. However, this
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traditional method has led to some questions as to some of the practices of the
underwriter. For example, is the offer price discounted in an effort to satisfy the
underwriter’s preferred customers?  Deep discounting suggests that the firm may
not have received an optimal price for its stock.
Recently, the IPO process has experienced some significant changes
involving the Internet. In the first phase, a portion of the issue is distributed via the
Internet. In the second phase, the offer price and the investors have also been
determined through some form of online auction mechanism. This may result in a
more efficient offer price for a company’s IPO and certainly implies a gradual
disintermediation process as the need for brokerage and other solicitation activities
of investment banks is mitigated. 
These changes have added one more choice for the issuing firm to make
when going public: whether to use online investment banking for their IPO. In this
research, we limited our focus to the first phase of the Internet IPO evolution and
sought to determine what factors are important in making the decision to use online
investment banking.  In addition, we examined the financial performance differences
between IPOs that were sold via the Internet versus those sold through the
traditional method.  If Internet IPOs do not run-up as much as the traditional IPOs,
it might suggest that online banking reduces offer price discounting and suggests
that it is a more efficient means of selling equity for the issuing firm.
We compared a sample of Internet IPOs with a contemporaneous sample
of traditional IPOs, half matched within one day of the issue day and half matched
by the first two digits of the SIC code. We found that the Internet IPO firms were
larger, had younger CEOs, and chose more reputable investment banks than the
firms that chose the traditional method of going public. We found consistent results
with a logistic regression model where firms with younger CEOs and those involved
in a Web-related business were the most likely to use the Internet to sell their equity
issue.
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The Internet IPOs also had greater cumulative returns, daily trading ranges,
and daily share volumes than the traditional IPOs. The higher returns for the
Internet IPOs suggests one of two things. Either their underwriters are still
discounting the offer price relative to the market value of the firm or the underwriters
are not good at pricing these firms. Given that the Internet IPO underwriters are
some of the best, we would contend that the former explanation is more likely.
Finally, the standard deviation of after-market returns was also significantly higher
for the Internet IPOs, suggesting that they are considerably more risky than the
traditional IPOs.
In terms of performance, we found that use of the Internet was positively
related to the initial return, but we found that the initial return was negatively related
to CEO age and Web-related business activities. Assuming that the positive market
response simply reflects more offer price discounting by the underwriter, this result
suggests that the underwriter is discounting to reflect the large amount of risk
inherent in this new way of selling IPOs and the younger CEOs. In terms of longer-
term after-market performance, only the daily volume was related, suggesting that
higher volumes accompany higher returns.  This is a common finding in previous
work (Karpoff 1987).
Because this study involves a very recent development in financial markets,
the sample size is small. Hence, any conclusions must be tempered by the
possibility that this sample is not representative of the population of IPOs. Future
studies of phase II or phase III online IPO processes will have considerably more
data available.  However, our findings are, in general, consistent with previous work
and engender quite reasonable explanations. In the final analysis, our study simply
says that Internet IPOs, while new, are not that different from traditional IPOs and
the variables that explain differences in market performance are more related to
fundamental characteristics of the firm, the CEO, the line of business, and the
inherent risk than the micro-structure of Internet activity.
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